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IntroductionIn the current controversial and intense debates on theories of power, Deleuze issomething of a foreign body. He denies easy access. He denies it because he does not fitthe usual coordinates and because he asserts apparently contradictory things. As astructuralist, he pleads for a “generalized anti-Hegelianism” (2004: xxvii) – and thusmeets expectations which deem to recognize in structuralism a position that isfundamentally dissociated from dialectical thought (and from the category ofsubjectivity used by it). On the other hand, as a theorist of capitalism, who describes thedynamics of the global economy in terms of processes of de- and reterritorialization, hedoes not only offer linking points for postmarxist discourses, but also works against aMarxist background in his own theorizing. He agrees with Foucault that, in contrast tothe prevailing views of the theoretical tradition, power is not to be regarded asunproductive and merely negating or limiting, as a prohibition or a limitation of thefreedom to act – and neither as an individually or institutionally manageable resource tobring about effects, e.g. to enforce or to thwart actions. However, despite his closeness toFoucault, he considers it necessary to relate the concept of resistance to that of power ina different way. At one point he writes that he does not want to forgo considering“effects of repression” (1997: 186) And it is well known that he clearly distinguisheswhat he calls ‘control societies’ from ‘disciplinary societies’, while Foucault does notseem to draw much of a distinction between surveiller and contrôler.The list of equivocations could easily be extended. In order to end it for the timebeing and to take a step forward, it is worth recalling that Deleuze (1992) makes asuggestion to reformulate Foucault’s concept of the dispositif. In his reading, the
dispositif is transformed into an agencement, i.e. a composition or compilation which, asordered, is at the same time an order (and an ordering), even if without the guarantee ofsome sort of stability, however constituted. A kind of agency that collects and mediatesby creating conditions, conditions for actions as well as things, for the visible as well asthe sayable. In English the term is translated as ‘assemblage’; in German mostly as
Gefüge. In the present context, it can also simply be rendered as power or powerrelation. With regard to Foucault, the conceptual shifts to be observed here are quite
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similar to those in the case of ‘genealogy’, insofar as it is understood as a method ofinvestigating power relations. In both cases, the conceptual shifts can be reconstructedby addressing the underlying character of the immanence of power. Immanence, Isuggest, is conceived quite differently by Foucault and Deleuze. If Deleuze is to beinvoked as a theorist of power, one is bound to elucidate his understanding of power asimmanence. This, in turn, makes it necessary to recapitulate his reading of thephilosophical positions which have shaped his own conception of the subject: Nietzscheand Spinoza.
Power as ImmanenceIn contrast to Foucault, the concept of immanence in Deleuze can be used to describe hisphilosophy as a whole (cf. Bryant 2008; Rölli 2011; Beistegui 2012). Already in his bookon Nietzsche (1962), the demand is made to realize with Nietzsche a critique that goesbeyond the Kantian critique. This philosophically radical critique is conceived as an“immanent critique” (Deleuze 2002: 91) which generalizes the immanent use of reason –in the Kantian sense, yet also turned against Kant. Essentially, Deleuze’s aim here is notonly to relate the ideas of reason (in the field of theoretical philosophy according toKant) to experience, but to reject the metaphysical foundation of structures a priori,which in turn (against Kant) transcend experience. It is even possible to rediscover thisthought in schematic form in his study on Hume (1953), where empiricist immanence isplayed off against the consolidation of fixed structures of transcendental subjectivity (cf.Deleuze 1991). This is important in that the term ‘philosophy of immanence’ rightlyrefers to an empiricism which claims a new radicality for itself around 1900 – not only inNietzsche and representatives of a philosophical psychology, but also in the context ofpragmatism and empiriocriticism.These early references notwithstanding, it is only the book on Spinoza (1968) thatfirst marks the definitive key position of the concept of immanence (cf. Deleuze 2005).With Spinoza, immanence moves to the center of Deleuzian philosophy – and there itremains up to the very last texts, together with the high appreciation for Spinoza, orbetter: with the systematic weight of the philosophical endeavor of his Ethics. TheSpinozist principle of immanence is at the center of the ontology of univocity whichDeleuze unfolds in the first chapter of Difference and Repetition. And in What Is
Philosophy?, published in 1991 and coauthored with Guattari, immanence denotes aphilosophical plane of thought, an indispensable orientation in thought, or a “modern”(1994: 54) (no longer morally-metaphysically stylized) “image of thought”(Deleuze/Guattari 1994: 54) which, by law, excludes the illusions of transcendence. Allconceptual thinking presupposes immanence – and can therefore be analyzedgenealogically. “We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that
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which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought withinthought. It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does notsucceed in thinking it. It is the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside[…].” (Deleuze/Guattari 1994: 59) And if there was a philosopher who understood “thatimmanence was only immanent to itself […]” (Deleuze/Guattari 1994: 48), then it wasSpinoza. “Perhaps he is the only philosopher never to have compromised withtranscendence and to have hunted it down everywhere. […] Spinoza is the vertigo ofimmanence from which so many philosophers try in vain to escape. Will we ever bemature enough for a Spinozist inspiration?” (Deleuze/Guattari 1994: 48)The use Deleuze makes of Spinoza revolves around an ontologically conceiveddifference. A difference which declares itself from the being itself – by referringphilosophically to temporally, spatially, and otherwise determined processes ofbecoming, which cannot be grounded in fixed identities. A difference in which being orblocks of being splinter, which makes it possible to think relations of immanence. Hereinlies one motive for the philosophical relevance of Deleuze and the frequently expressedview that the ontology sought after today, an ontology of processes, nature or life, ofmodes of existence and collectives, or of a new realism and a new metaphysics, is mostlikely to make a find in his ontology of difference. However, one must be careful not toconfuse the differential ontology of processes with a romanticism of indeterminacy1It therefore seems natural – in the sense of an antidote – to define immanence aspower. This approach is supported by the sources that Deleuze names foremost: Spinozaand Nietzsche. After all, the concept of the will to power is one that Deleuze utilizes forthe development of his ontology; and in Spinoza, too, power – understood as potentia
agendi – must be conceived as an immanent process which affirms and amplifies itself. Iwill return to these aspects in a moment, but before, an obvious problem has to bepointed out, a problem that, it seems, Deleuze shares with Foucault.After all, power and counter-power, power and resistance – or, put differently:representation and difference, are not the same. Or are they? Is the dark power notconfronted by another, whereby it – the tacit agreement with it – can be fought? Frommy point of view, these questions are not easy to answer; they rather requirecomplicated answers. And although Deleuze and Foucault share this problem, theyanswer it in different ways, with different accentuations (cf. also Saar, forthcoming).The theory of power which Foucault outlines in The Will to Knowledge meets thedemand placed upon it to conceive power as a productive force. Power is understood as
1 Desire – one could think of the Spinozist conatus here – operates according to a logic of the divinemachine. It implies relations of force in the sense of a social unconscious that can be mapped. In contrast,the appeal to a ‘vitalistic nature of man’ etc. shields itself off from, e.g., technically mediated relations ofimmanence, which function as man’s condition.
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a complex formation of differential relations that produces identities, forms ofindividualization, orders of the visible and the sayable, strategies for the regulation of apolitically manageable life of populations. This is, in other words, a dispositif, which, onthe one hand, exhibits “the moving substrate of force relations” (Foucault 1978: 93),“which by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latterare always local and unstable” (Foucault 1978: 93), and which, on the other hand,consolidates the “representation of power” (Foucault 1978: 88) that results from theirstrategies. They form in their entirety the unity of the dispositif, their “general design orinstitutional crystallization” is embodied in the “social hegemonies” (Foucault 1978: 93).One might say that power comprises at least three things: (1) differential micro-relations, (2) strategies of specific forms of actualization, and (3) actualities asconcentrations of power that consolidate social hierarchies. Foucault focuses on the twolast points. With Deleuze, on the other hand, there is at first a strong tendency toconcentrate on points one and three – and to contrast them: difference versusrepresentation, immanence versus transcendence. At the same time, however, he alsokeeps the connecting dimension in view – and he discusses it in terms of processes ofactualization and repetition. But he does not do so with regards to a theory of power. Itis only in A Thousand Plateaus (1980), in reaction to Foucault’s deliberations, that he andGuattari take up the notion of power processes as productive actualizations which occurin a differential milieu – and which nevertheless have fatal consequences. Here, thedistinction becomes important that, with Deleuze, one can also make between power andimmanence. Immanence which is only immanent to itself – or which corresponds to apurely differential ontology – may be thought as power (in the sense of power 1). But itwill not create conditions that, in the sense of a strategically directed unification of thedifferential, cement power blocks (in the sense of power 3). In other words: nomadologyis not subject to any dispositif in the Foucauldian sense, whereas sovereignty-boundstate thinking (or the juridical representation of power – that is, of the modern power ofdiscipline and of life) is.When Deleuze accuses Foucault of marginalizing resistance, Foucault can reply thathe hypostatizes resistance (along with the lines of flight of immanence). This just aboutsummarizes the state of their discussions in the second half of the 1970s.2 WhileFoucault analyzes the productivity of power, in order to extract the dispositif of sexualityalong with the discourses of truth and freedom that are connected with it, Deleuzeaccentuates micropolitics and the processes of becoming-minoritarian, i.e. practicalforms of resistance that coexist with a thinking of the immanence of power (andconnected with this: with a critique of its forms of representation geared towardstranscendence). In the inability of representation to think its own emergence the
2 Deleuze has documented his reflections on the theory of power in Foucault’s The Will to Knowledge in ashort text: cf. Deleuze 1997. For a discussion of this text, cf. Krause/Rölli 2005.
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Foucauldian idea is reflected that the power in the dispositif ensures that it has secrets –and at the same time installs the imperative to lift them, to recognize the truth, to finallybe free. Yet, the secret is nothing other than the misconceived productivity of poweritself – or put differently: its hedged ignorance. In The Will to Knowledge, truth functionsas meaning and as something desirable with nihilistic qualities because it helps tomaintain a striving for power that – in contrast to its aims and ideals (or in contrast tothe juridical representation) – cannot affirm itself.
Will to Power – NietzscheIn the chapter on subjectivation of the book on Foucault (1986), analogous to the newdiscussions of the technologies of the self and the relations of the self to itself of theancient Greeks conducted by Foucault starting with the second volume of his history ofsexuality, Deleuze adds another dimension to the forms of knowledge and powerdiscussed so far (cf. Deleuze 2006). This is a dimension concerning the self-referentialityof power or a folding of forces which, in their movement, break from the strict codes. Byno means does it assume the ontological function of establishing a naturalcorrespondence between the visible and the sayable. Rather, it interrupts the (by naturesubject-logical) mediation, creates a milieu of pragmatic relations, and at the same timeescapes the framework of its regular assignment. With this consideration, Deleuzecombines the aspect of subjectivation with an extension of the Foucauldian theory ofpower, insofar as he focuses on its “points of deterritorialization” (1997: 187) (power 1),makes these coextensive with the primacy of immanence and resistance, and separatesthem from the diagrams (power 2) that form current social hierarchies and monopoliesof governance (power 3) (analogous to the structures of discipline or sexuality). Theself-referentiality of power, in turn, is explained with recourse to Nietzsche: “It wasnecessary to recover force, in the Nietzschean sense, or power, in the very particularsense of ‘will to power’ […].” (Deleuze 2006: 93) According to Deleuze, this force exhibitsthe self-referentiality which can be developed from the immanence of power (power 1).With it, the focus of the notion of immanence no longer lies in a specific mode ofreference between power and knowledge, or in their reciprocal implication, but isshifted into an area which is independent of the orders of knowledge and power.As early as at the beginning of the 1960s, Deleuze had described the will to power asa “genealogical element of force” or as power’s “principle of the synthesis” (2002: 51,50). Genealogical means both, differential and genetic – in the sense of an immanentproduction of empirical (“differentiated and qualified”, Deleuze 2002: 68) conditions.Thus, the will to power functions as an “internal element of […] production” (Deleuze2002: 51), insofar as differential differences of quantity generate empirical qualities oftheir own accord. From Deleuze’s point of view, it is, firstly, possible with Nietzsche to
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determine power immanently or genealogically, by referring it to the will to power.
Secondly, the phenomena of the denial of the will – and the becoming-reactive of forcesconnected with it – can be reconstructed. And thirdly, it can be shown that there is a linkbetween nihilism and representation which is substantial for the theory of power.By ‘will to power’ Nietzsche does not mean a striving for power. In a paradoxicalformulation Deleuze maintains that the will to power in any case does not want thepower. It is neither the goal nor the motive of the will’s desire. If it were, then powercould be identified with an object of representation (power 3). In this way, its immanentdetermination – and the possibility of a genealogical investigation of representativestandards of validity – would likewise be given up. According to Deleuze, precisely this isthe case whenever power is reduced to the recognition or the enforcement ofdomination. “The famous dialectical aspect of the master-slave relationship depends onthe fact that power is conceived not as will to power but as representation of power,representation of superiority, recognition by ‘the one’ of the superiority of ‘the other’.”(Deleuze 2002: 10) Similarly, Heidegger, in his interpretation, misunderstood thegenealogical principle of the will to power, since he believed to recognize in it a figure ofunfettered subjectivity which carries representative thinking to extremes.3 By contrast,what is crucial for Deleuze is Nietzsche’s notion that power – which, for structuralreasons, cannot develop an affirmative relationship to the will actualizing itself in it – isnot good, but rather bad – and this regardless of its potential broad effectiveness. It isbad because and insofar as it is nihilist in itself and collaborates with discursiveidentities which, in their systematic determination, exclude its genealogy. That means, inother words, that it transcends the frame of validity of its perspectivity and finiteness,the earthly and transient, affective and contingent events – in the metaphysical searchfor certainty.So what is the relevance of Nietzsche’s thinking on power? It opens up agenealogical or novel power-analytical perspective by immanently makingcomprehensible what concrete strategies and operations are at work when ideas of ahigher power are institutionalized. The focus of his analyses is on topics pertaining tothe critique of metaphysics, morality and religion; e.g. feelings of guilt, bad conscience,ressentiment, will to truth, ascetic ideals. One of the most important analyticalhypotheses is that the ideas of a higher power are incompatible with the concretestrategies and operations which have historically produced them. Or, more precisely:
3 Already Klages had discovered in Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power an all too profane, purpose-driven striving for power, which, supposedly, stood in peculiar contrast to his allegedly romantic, nature-philosophical (Dionysian) aspirations (cf. 1958: 197). One could say with Heidegger that Nietzscheremained trapped in the quasi-psychological spell of (re-)presentation – or, with Sartre, that he could notgo beyond the illusion of immanence. According to Deleuze, this aspect of the criticism of Nietzsche ischaracteristic of phenomenological thinking insofar as it introduces a new figure of transcendence intoimmanence (intentionality, ecstasy of being, temporal structures of Begegnen- or Anwesen-lassen, etc.).
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that these ideas and beliefs are of a nihilistic type, insofar as they  are threatened by thedescription of their own genesis and, at the core, can even be destroyed by it. In its logic,this procedure corresponds to Foucault’s unmasking of the juridical representation ofpower. Through the demonstration of the productive power relations of the discipliningof the body (in the prison, the barracks and educational institutions) and the regulationof life (in medicine, psychiatry, social statistics and demographic policy) the discursiveself-conception of power which is focused on sovereign authorities collapses. But inwhat way can Deleuze now bring into play the concept of the will to power in order toextend the analysis of power beyond the critical dimension of genealogy? From my pointof view, one option lies in further insisting on immanence – an immanence with whichpower (in the sense of power 1) fuses – and this makes it necessary to speak of Spinozaat the end.
Agency – SpinozaThe focus of Ethics is on the problem of becoming-active or of increasing the capacity toact in the sense of a power of action (potentia agendi). The good and a pure positivitywhich is rooted in the active self-affirmation of the essential mode of existence – in thedesire of pleasure and the pleasure of desire – are intertwined with this power.Apparently, Deleuze connects this power with the immanent causality of an adequatecause of this action, i.e. to realize and to be able to realize that the affects have anactivating or pleasure-producing effect. And this presupposes that bodies which affectand are affected by each other jointly increase their capacity to act – and can find(adequate) common concepts only in this congruence. Whereas there is a reduction ofthe capacity to act wherever it is inhibited – by the advent of passive affects or suffering.With passivity, there appears an external power which separates the existing modesfrom what they are capable of doing. This powerlessness possesses no positivity in thesense that it expresses only an incapability, a power of negation. With it, the productivityof power is eliminated by preventing the existing modes from associating and fromexperiencing in their relationships the increasing of their power to affect and to beaffected, and thus also: to act and to think. This process of increasing power is neither tobe reduced to individuals nor to their selfish interests. Rather, it asserts its immanentcharacter by coming from below and by being effective in all social relations thatcontribute to the benefit and well-being – but not to the harm and detriment – of theinvolved parties. There may be particular difficulties in dealing with the ethical criterionof Spinoza (increase or diminution of the power to act). But adherence to transcendentcrutches remains an indication of dogmatic preconceptions that obscure the contingent,precarious, and open process (of political association) – through anthropomorphisms,
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teleological assumptions, or truths of faith that consolidate hierarchical socialstructures.With this minimal sketch of the Spinozist understanding of power, the distinctionbetween Foucault and Deleuze, which was anticipated at the beginning, can be made stillclearer. Deleuze distinguishes himself as an (immanence-philosophical) theorist ofpower not only by conceiving, with Nietzsche, the will to power as a pluralistic conceptof the differential, micro-physical processes of power (power 1), but also, with Spinoza,by dealing with a process of becoming-democratic which, in its radicality, remainsimmanent to itself – and therefore cannot be translated into the text of discipline andcontrol together with their discursive representation. Power comes from below –because, with Foucault, it does not come from above; its productive unfolding demandsthe king’s head in theory, too. But it also comes from below because, with Spinoza, itcannot be reduced to strategies that train the individual body and politically andeconomically administer the life of the population. It is a power of practice or of micro-practice which undermines the great dispositifs and assemblages, even though it itselfproduces associations and connections. However, these are of a different type becausetheir rules of connection permit heterogeneous concatenations and sabotage theschematic unification of singular constellations.In this sense one can say that Deleuze succeeds in productively taking up theobjections to Foucault’s theory of power which were submitted by the theorists ofpractice (cf. de Certeau 1988). With regard to Latour’s objections, it can be said that theknowledge of power relations is not elitist knowledge, provided that power is alwaysalso described analytically-critically not behind collective fields of action but in themidst of them. As is well known, with the concept of micropolitics, Deleuze and Guattaribuild on the microsociology of Tarde. It is therefore not surprising that, like Latour in hissociology of associations, which also draws on Tarde, they describe and compile smallassemblages of micropractices which defy the established orders of representation, e.g.because they put things in relation that do not correspond to the canonical lists ofserious actors or to stable system boundaries. In contrast to Latour, however, they holdon to the use of the concept of power. This arguably makes sense mainly because theirassemblages or agencements at the same time integrate all dimensions of power, i.e., runto and fro between the virtual and the actual determinations. They are hybridconstellations of discursive and non-discursive practices which link lines of de- andreterritorialization.Otherwise it is difficult to imagine how power relations might immanently becriticized. For this, it must be possible to move within power and to take into accountthe operations of its current formation, the schemata of the dominating culturalidentities and the guidelines of normalization. In this sense, with Spinoza, a micropolitics
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opens up which is related to the presence of representation and can set off from itprocesses of becoming-other.4 Deleuze and Guattari have developed the concept ofbecoming-minoritarian for this process. As in the case of becoming-other, the processesof becoming-minoritarian are also characterized by the fact that they expose theinvolved group identities to mutual changes. They are, as it were, critical practices thatintervene in hierarchical power relations by strengthening the immanent processes.How is that possible? A becoming-minoritarian always happens when a majority, whichacts as a representative standard, is disturbed. The majority is here not to bemisunderstood as a numerical quantity. Rather, it is defined as a human (cultural,economic) norm: male, white, adult, rational, healthy – and we could add: heterosexual,Christian, employed, productive, flexible, functional, informed, well-dressed and well-proportioned. Its standards not only define goals of normalization, they can also beabandoned or changed. While minorities, like majorities, can be regarded as fixedidentities, becoming-minoritarian refers to a development that triggers transformationprocesses in both directions – in relation to the majority and at the same time to theminority. In this context, Deleuze and Guattari speak of a “block of becoming” (2005:238) or of a “double movement” (2000: 259): “one by which a term (the subject) iswithdrawn from the majority, and another by which a term (the medium or agent) risesup from the minority.” (2005: 291) Becoming-Jewish, becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-invisible. In all these cases, standards of the distinguished identity ofbeing human, which embody the asymmetrical power relations, are abandoned by at thesame time breaching the definition of the minority as minority. “As Faulkner said, toavoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to become-black.”(Deleuze/Guattari 2000: 292) A minority loses its identity of an inferior existence,defined in a majoritarian way, only by itself becomingminoritarian – i.e. by underminingthe hierarchical distribution of power along with its discursive and institutional support.It is a question of becoming. Becoming-minoritarian brings forth associations whichresult from a reciprocal transformation of the (majoritarian/minoritarian) identities, sothat an increase of the joint agency (power 1) is achieved – and this automatically at theexpense of a power of representation (power 3) which can only become effective in thereduction of the collective capacity to act.5 This is not a utopia but the reality of a varietyof everyday practices, which here and there merge into small social movements.6
4 For Latour, on the other hand, it seems to be sufficient to assign the accepted stock of social givens,stabilized facts and that which is already assembled, to the traditional ‘sociology of the social’, while thenew ‘sociology of associations’ describes the empirical connections and real processes that take place inthe actor-networks – which are distinguished from the representative social stock. He underlines that thegiven is rightly taken into account, but should not be used for explanations (of something else). It remainsquestionable how the two can be neatly separated if the actors – and at the same time their own theoriesin a sociologized world – are to be followed. Cf. Latour 2007.5 Transferred to the ethnological analysis of one’s own colonial tradition, this means: It is not enough todescribe the minor – or that which has been declared primitive – in order to abolish the colonial status,
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If it is true that the crisis of discipline described by Deleuze has long since arisen –and that the present situation has produced new power mechanisms of control – thenthis diagnosis does not alter the fact that there are immanently determined forms ofresistance and power (power 1) in becoming-minoritarian. According to Deleuze, theregime of control, too, must be one that emerges from below, by establishing throughthe use of novel strategies (power 2) living conditions which, in turn, are based ondiscursive representations (power 3).7 It is easily possible to distinguish the threedimensions of power, even if they transform in their concrete manifestations. With theterm ‘control’, Deleuze aims at the virtual-real modeling of conditions of action, themechanisms of which are problematic where they integrate blockades into the relationsof immanence and curtail possibilities of association. Controlled, authorized identitiesresult from selective processes or filtration systems – and as always there is a remainderwhich, due to its non-representation, must contain minoritarian determinations. Theycontain the potentials of becoming, which, however, can only unfold in a process ofchange involving both sides (majority and minority).
translated from German by Florian Cord
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